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Abstract 
In this paper, user expectations with regard to privacy and consent when using social 
media are compared with the EU legal framework for personal data protection. This 
analysis is based on a set of criteria for informed consent distilled from an analytical 
bibliography. User expectations regarding these criteria are derived from survey 
results. For each of the criteria for informed consent it is assessed whether there exists 
legal provisions in the existing EU personal data protection law and in the proposed 
legal framework in this area. A gap analysis between user expectations regarding each 
criterion and the availability or absence of related legal provisions shows that many 
but not all aspects of consent are addressed in both the current and the proposed 
legislation. Furthermore, the EU personal data protection legislation only provides a 
very general scope regarding consent and does not contain many details on what 
adequate consent procedures should look like. There is, at some points, a disconnect 
between the abstract legal provisions and the concrete practical implementations in the 
architecture and privacy statements of social media. Suggestions for solving these 
disconnects are made by suggesting changes at a practical level, by adjusting the legal 
framework, or both. Finally, the limits of the current models for personal data 
protection and consent are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, social media have attracted a large increase of users. Lots of people 
are moving online to use both User Generated Content websites (UGCs), like 
YouTube and Wikipedia, and Social Network Sites (SNSs), like Facebook and 
Google+. However, since the success of many of these websites depends to a large 
extent on the disclosure of personal data by its users, some concerns about privacy 
issues have been raised. Although it may be argued that users voluntarily sign away 
their privacy by using these social media when creating accounts and putting their 
personal data online, it is not clear how consent actually works in these situations.  
The research results described in this paper are part of a larger research project called 
CONSENT
1
, which was co-funded by the European Union under the Seventh 
Framework Programme. This project examined how consumer behaviour and 
commercial practices are changing the role of consent in the processing of personal 
data. Part of the project was to investigate the current practices of social media, user 
expectations with regard to privacy and consent and the legal provisions for informed 
consent. In previous research, we examined the current practices of eight social media 
sites by analysing their privacy statements.
2
 These results were compared and 
contrasted with user expectations regarding informed consent derived from survey 
results. 
In this paper, a set of criteria for informed consent is assessed, focusing on the 
question of the extent to which there exist legal provisions both in the existing and in 
the proposed legal framework of EU personal data protection. A gap analysis is made 
between user expectations regarding each criterion and the availability or absence of 
related legal provisions in both the current and the proposed legislation. Where there 
is a disconnect between the legal provisions and the user expectations, practical 
changes or changes in the legal framework are suggested. 
This paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, the set of criteria for consent that was 
used for our analysis is set forth. In Section 3, the user expectations for each of the 
criteria are analysed using survey results. In Section 4, an analysis is carried out on 
which legal provisions are present in both the existing and the proposed EU legal 
frameworks for data protection. In Section 5, a gap analysis is made between the legal 
framework and user expectations. Furthermore, practical changes and changes in the 
legal framework are suggested that may address any disconnects discovered in the gap 
analysis. In Section 6, the limits of the current models for personal data protection and 
consent are discussed. Finally, in Section 7, conclusions are provided.  
 
 
 
                                               
1 “CONSENT” available at <www.consent.law.muni.cz> (accessed 12 Dec 13). 
2 B Custers, B Schermer and S Van der Hof, “User Expectations Regarding Social Media Privacy 
Statements”, (Annual Conference on Management and Social Sciences, Bangkok April 2013).  
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2. Criteria for Consent 
The compare and contrast analyses of our research are based on a set of criteria for 
consent. These criteria are based on an analysis of a bibliography on existing privacy 
criteria,
3
 an analysis of the concepts on which the existing legal obligations with 
regard to consent are based
4
 and further social and psychological elements pertaining 
to individual users, including user needs, interests and preferences, derived from the 
idea that consent is an instrument to equip people with control over their own lives 
(autonomy) and over their personal information (privacy or informational self-
determination).
5
 
In general, the process of providing consent is only considered fair when the person 
involved is properly informed of what exactly he or she is consenting to and is thus 
able and enabled, to some extent, to assess the consequences such consent may have. 
This is indicated with the term informed consent. Informed consent is used to ensure 
that people make well-considered decisions. Hence, the condition is generally added 
that consent must be informed. In this paper, by consent we mean informed consent. 
Table 1 presents the criteria that were used to determine whether there is informed 
consent. We distinguish between criteria that focus on the consent itself (i.e., who can 
give consent and how can consent be given?) and criteria that focus on the condition 
that the consent is in fact informed consent (i.e. what information should be provided 
and how should it be provided?). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
3 L Mommers and H Kielman “Analytical bibliography of existing privacy criteria, Deliverable 9.1 of 
Consent “(2013). available at http://www.consent.law.muni.cz (forthcoming). 
4 W Nazarek “Impact of common policies and practices: legal requirements for obtaining consent, 
Deliverable 6.1 of Consent” (2013) available at http://www.consent.law.muni.cz (forthcoming). 
5
 A Westin Privacy and Freedom (London: Bodley Head, 1967). 
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Table 1: Set of criteria for consent 
Criteria 
regarding the 
decision to 
consent 
Criteria regarding 
the person who 
consents 
C1.1 Is the person who consents an adult? If not, is there parental 
consent? 
C1.2 Is the person who consents capable to consent? If not, is 
there a legal representative who consent? 
C1.3 Is the person who consents competent to consent? 
Criteria on how to 
give consent 
C2.1 Is the consent written? 
C2.2 Is the consent partial or full? In case of partial consent, does 
the consent cover the purpose? 
C2.3 Is the consent reasonably strong? 
C2.4 Is the consent an independent decision? 
C2.5 Is the consent up to date?  
Criteria 
regarding how 
well-
considered the 
decision to 
consent was 
Criteria regarding 
what information 
should be 
provided 
C3.1 Is it clear which data are collected, used and shared? 
C3.2 Are the purposes clear? 
C3.3 Is it clear which security measures are taken? 
C3.4 Is it clear who is processing the data and who is 
accountable? 
C3.5 Is it clear which rights can be exercised? Is it clear how these 
rights can be exercised? 
Criteria regarding 
how information 
should be 
provided 
C4.1 Is the information provided specific and sufficiently 
detailed? 
C4.2 Is the information provided understandable? 
C4.3 Is the information provided reliable and accurate? 
C4.4 Is the information provided accessible? 
 
3. User Expectations 
Based on the results of an extensive online survey
6
 and in-depth interviews with 
internet users,
7
 which were carried out in thirteen countries of the EU as part of the 
CONSENT project and additional literature, we analysed which of the criteria in 
Table 1 are important to users. The survey used in this section was part of our EU 
funded research project called CONSENT, which was set-up by the University of 
Malta (one of the key partners in the research project) and translated and disseminated 
by the nineteen partners in the research consortium. A snowball technique was used 
by the partners to distribute the links to the survey, which involved asking people to 
complete the survey and further distribute it. To promote the survey a combination of 
various dissemination channels were used including: press releases, mailing lists, 
newsletter, banners, articles in newspapers, journals (online and paper versions) and 
promotion on specific websites of public and private stakeholders such as on social 
media (e.g. creation of specific Facebook events or blogging) and personalised emails.  
The survey was an online survey regarding the awareness, values and attitudes of 
social media users towards privacy. The survey was comprised of seventy-five 
                                               
6 N Brockdorff et al “Quantitative measurement of end-user attitudes towards privacy, Work Package 7 
of Consent” (2013) available at http://www.consent.law.muni.cz (forthcoming). 
7 B Manolea et al “Qualitative study of UGC users and UGC non-users attitudes towards privacy, Work 
Package 8 of Consent” (2013) available at http://www.consent.law.muni.cz (forthcoming). 
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questions and subquestions covering general Internet usage, online behaviour, 
particularly regarding online shopping and UGCs, and the related consumer 
perceptions and attitudes. Attitudes and practices in the disclosure of personal data 
and online privacy were particularly addressed. The survey was available online 
between July 2011 and December 2011. A total of 8,621 respondents from twenty-six 
countries completed at least a part of the questionnaire. It was possible for 
respondents to choose not to respond to all questions in the online survey. Thus, the 
number of respondents to different questions varies in the results reported in this 
paper. Percentages reported below are based on the number of respondents to that 
question, except for questions that allowed or required more than one answer, in 
which case the number of responses was used rather (than the number of 
respondents).  
Of the total number of respondents, 45% were male and 55% female. The average age 
of respondents was 30 years old. The highest level of education was 34% secondary 
school or lower and 66% tertiary education. 45% of the respondents were students. 
71% of the respondents described their location as urban, 13% as suburban and 16% 
as rural. This quantitative analysis does not claim to be representative of the entire EU 
population, since the sample used was a non-probability sample: the questionnaire 
was online (excluding people without internet access) and the dissemination, though 
targeted at wider public to include all age groups, education levels and geographic 
locations, originated from the partners in the project, many of which are universities. 
This has resulted in a sample that is more likely to be representative of experienced 
Internet users.
8
 The criteria regarding the person who consents seem to be more 
important to data controllers than to data subjects, as they may indicate whether users 
are authorised and committed and whether accepted user agreements are legally 
binding. Some users may consider these criteria as a hindrance, as users who do not 
meet one or more of these criteria may be excluded from UGC and SNS services. This 
is most apparent for age (C1.1). It is commonly accepted that SNS services are 
particularly something „for the youngest generation‟. According to research carried 
out within the EU Kids Online project, 59% of nine to sixteen year olds have a social 
networking profile.
9
 From the perspective of minors, it is fair to state that social media 
are, in general, important to them. The Eurobarometer survey on “Attitudes on Data 
Protection and Electronic Identity”10 found that “around 94% of the 15-24 year olds 
are using the Internet,” compared to 66% of the EU overall 66%. 84% of fifteen to 
twenty-four year olds are using social networking sites (EU overall 52%) and 73% are 
using websites to share pictures, videos and movies (EU overall 44%). According to 
another recent study, 44% of teens have lied about how old they are online in order to 
                                               
8 For further background of the survey, including its set-up, the number and composition of 
respondents and the reliability of the results, we refer to the CONSENT website available at 
http://www.consent.law.muni.cz. 
9 S Livingstone et al “Risks and safety on the Internet: The perspective of European children” (2011) 
available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/research/EUKidsOnline/EU%20Kids%20II%20%282009-
11%29/EUKidsOnlineIIReports/D4FullFindings.pdf (accessed 12 Dec 13).  
10 Eurobarometer, “Attitudes on Data Protection and Electronic Identity in the European Union” (2011) 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_359_en.pdf (accessed 12 Dec 13). 
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access sites with age restrictions,
11
 suggesting that such teens are younger than the 
required age for access. It should be noted that apart from obtaining access to 
particular websites, minors might have other reasons for lying about their age, such as 
their reputation among peers.  
This is different for the capability (C1.2) and competence (C1.3) criteria to consent. 
According to the survey results, the majority of the respondents who read privacy 
statements indicated they completely understood (21%) the privacy statement or at 
least understood most parts (42%). It is important to note that these figures refer only 
to those respondents who indicated that they did in fact read privacy statements and 
thus does not apply to all respondents. However, the survey importantly revealed that 
most respondents never (27%), rarely (27%) or sometimes (23%) read the privacy 
statements.
12
 Hence, most Internet users who responded to this survey question did 
not read privacy statements, whilst a comparably large portion of those who 
responded that they do read privacy policies show confidence in their understanding 
of such statements. Such results may be contrasted to the cited Eurobarometer survey, 
which found that 58% of European Internet users “usually” read privacy statements. 
Nevertheless, the fact that users feel capable of understanding (see also C4.1) the 
privacy statements does not imply that they do actually understand the privacy 
statements.  
Most respondents (75%) sometimes, often or always watch for ways to control what 
they are sent online (such as tick boxes that allow opt-in or opt-out of certain offers). 
These results suggest that people consider such controls important. This may also 
indicate that users think written consent (C2.1) is important and that the extent of their 
consent is important (full or partial consent, C2.2). This was confirmed by another 
survey question, which resulted in 82% of the respondents indicating that they 
“sometimes”, “often” or “always” change their privacy settings when there are 
options available for personalising privacy settings.  
In addition to low rates of privacy policy reading as mentioned above, most 
respondents (73%) indicated that they never, rarely or sometimes read the terms and 
conditions before accepting them. When users do not read the privacy statement nor 
the terms and conditions, they likely do not know what they have consented to. As a 
result, their consent is unlikely to be strong consent (C2.3) and up to date (C2.5). 
Whether consent is an independent decision (C2.4), is difficult to answer, since the 
qualitative interview results suggest that users have a rather ambivalent relationship to 
UGC websites. Many users appear to sign up for accounts due to certain forms of peer 
pressure, but after an initial phase become low-frequency users. It might be argued 
that the extent to which people would miss a particular website indicates their 
dependency on this website. Although there is no research available on the link 
between not missing a particular website and the independence of consent decisions 
using the website, most users indicate they would not really miss a particular site if it 
were to close down. Only Facebook (by 59%), Twitter (by 28%) and LinkedIn (by 
6%) would be missed by users. Other websites are not missed (< 3%).  
                                               
11 Z Fox, “Nearly Half of Teen Internet Users Have Lied About Their Age” (2011) available at 
http://mashable.com/2011/12/13/teens-social-media (accessed 12 Dec 13). 
12 Importantly, this survey question included all Internet users, not merely UGC or SNS website users 
and thus included respondents who may only have an email account. 
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Users show concern for privacy, although there seems to be an incongruity between 
public opinion and public behaviour: people tend to express concern about privacy, 
but also routinely disclose personal data because of convenience, discounts, and other 
incentives, or a lack of understanding of the consequences.
13
 As there may be long 
periods of time between a) data collection and b) actions based upon the processing or 
sharing of such information, the connection between such data collection and any 
resulting decisions may not always be transparent for individuals. For instance, when 
the personal data collected is used for profiling, such profiling techniques (by their 
nature) tend not to be visible to the individual.
14 
The fact that users are concerned about their privacy is also confirmed by the survey 
results, as to the question where respondents indicated on a seven point Likert scale 
(ranging from “not at all” to “very much”) that there is a high potential for privacy 
loss associated with giving personal information to websites (mean 5.78, sd 1.43), and 
that privacy is the most important thing to preserve when online (mean 5.28, sd 1.59). 
Respondents clearly indicated which types of data they disclosed (C3.1) (which is 
largely in line with the Eurobarometer survey) and indicated their awareness of the 
purposes for which data controllers can and may collect, use and share personal data 
of users (C3.2). Most respondents (74%) indicated they were aware that their account 
or profile information may be used by the website owners for a number of purposes. 
Of these respondents, most were aware that this information can be used to customise 
the content a user sees (72%), to customise the advertising a user sees (79%) and to 
contact users by email (87%). There was also awareness, though less so, of other less 
publicised practices relating to the use of account and profile information: 61% were 
aware that information about user behaviour (not linked to the user‟s name) can be 
shared within the website owner‟s company; 61% were aware that this information 
(linked to the user‟s name) can be shared within the website owner‟s company; and 
54% were aware that such information (not linked to the user‟s name) can be sold to 
other companies. 
Regarding concerns for security measures (C3.3), the survey results indicated that the 
respondents‟ attitudes towards online technical protection measures are mostly in line 
with their awareness levels, with the exception of Ireland and the UK. The portion of 
respondents applying various security measures was on average above 50% and in 
some countries up to 90%. At the same time, the survey results suggested that most 
UGC and SNS users think it is unlikely that disclosing personal information on these 
websites puts their personal safety at risk. Similarly, respondents generally found it 
unlikely that they would become a victim of fraud, would be discriminated against or 
suffer reputational damage due to disclosures of personal information made online. 
These figures can suggest that many UGC and SNS users utilise their technical 
knowledge to protect themselves against physical or material risks and thus do not 
hold much concern in this respect. This contention is supported by the fact that users 
willingly disclose large amounts of personal information (see C3.1 above). However, 
                                               
13 P M Regan “Privacy and commercial use of personal data: policy developments in the US”(Rathenau 
Institute Privacy Conference, Amsterdam, Jan 2002). 
14 L A Bygrave Data protection law; approaching its rationale, logic and limits (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002); B H M, Custers, The Power of Knowledge; Ethical, Legal, and 
Technological Aspects of Data Mining and Group Profiling in Epidemiology (Tilburg: Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2004). 
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users may overestimate the quality of their security measures. For instance, users 
often choose easy-to-remember passwords, which are just as easy to breach.
15
 For 
teens easily breached passwords may be a bigger issue, as nearly one-third (30%) of 
teens have shared a password with a friend.
16
 
With regard to accountability of data controllers (C3.4), users want to know the data 
controller‟s reputation in order to decide whether to trust them.17 Trust in online 
companies is limited. According to the Eurobarometer survey, 70% of European 
citizens are concerned about how companies use their data, exhibited by higher levels 
of trust in public authorities versus private companies – the latter including online 
social networks and other Internet companies.
18
  
For user rights (C3.5), this is different, however. As indicated above, 72% of the 
respondents never, rarely or sometimes read the terms and conditions before 
acceptance. This indicates that users may not be well informed about their rights. This 
hypothesis is confirmed in other research, indicating that users are not always aware 
(enough) of their rights and obligations with respect to sharing (personal) data.
19
 It 
should be noted that users might also access other sources to inform themselves about 
their rights, such as consumer protection websites or the media. However, it is 
questionable whether such general sources can fully substitute the reading of the 
specific terms and conditions of a particular website. The conclusion that users do not 
care much about the rights they can exercise may seem to contradict the findings from 
many studies that citizens place a high value on their right to privacy.
20
 A possible 
explanation for this contradiction may be that users are often unaware of or not well 
informed about the rights they have, making it difficult for them to „match‟ the 
privacy policies and terms and conditions with the rights they have under the Data 
Protection Directive.
21
 Another possible explanation is that users simply trust that 
social network sites have the necessary mechanisms in place for users to exercise their 
rights, or trust that the regulator will step in if their rights are violated. The qualitative 
interview results indicated that „not reading‟ (i.e. not reading privacy statements) 
among interviewees was often based on a perception that prevailing offline conditions 
of perceived general social law and order could be assigned to the online 
environment. Other frequent reasons for not reading included the concept of privacy 
itself being underdeveloped (particularly in some Eastern European countries) and a 
perceived helplessness that was often masked as disinterest in online privacy issues. 
                                               
15 B Schneier Secrets and Lies; digital security in a networked world (New York: Wiley Computer 
Publishing, 2000). 
16 Z Fox, see note 11 above. 
17 D Solove The Future of Reputation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
18 Eurobarometer, see note 10 above. 
19 B Van den Berg and S Van der Hof “What happens to my data? A novel approach to informing users 
of data processing practices” (2012) 17 First Monday. 
20 D Hallinan, M Friedewald, and P McCarthy “Citizens' Perceptions of Data Protection and Privacy” 
(2012) 28 Computer Law and Security Review 263-272. 
21 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of 
such data available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML (accessed 12 Dec 13). 
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Another strong reason given for not reading was the perception that privacy policies 
primarily serve the purpose of protecting the website owners rather than the website 
users. 
The level of detail in the privacy statements (C4.1) was presented as a concern for 
most respondents. Many respondents (55%) indicated that they do not read the 
privacy statements because they are too long to read. The fact that respondents to this 
question considered the privacy statements too long and detailed is also found in other 
research, where it was indicated that users of social network sites do not want to 
spend a lot of time reading privacy statements, on average 1-5 minutes.
22
 However, 
most websites we analysed provide privacy statements that are much longer, often 
taking half an hour to read, and sometimes even an hour.
23
  
Respondents to found the information provided for their consent decisions (C4.2) as 
understandable. As mentioned above, 64% of respondents indicated that they 
understand the information completely or mostly. Only 5% of respondents indicated 
that they do not understand the information at all. Of the people who do not read 
privacy statements, a mere 9% indicated that they do not read privacy statements 
because they are too difficult to understand. In the Eurobarometer survey a quarter of 
those who read privacy statements said they do not fully understand them.
24
 Another 
indication that most users believe they understand privacy issues is the fact that when 
asked why they have never changed the privacy settings, only 12% indicated that they 
do not know how to change the privacy settings. Users may become too confident and 
falsely believe that they understand everything. A large number of interviewees in the 
qualitative interviews claimed that they found the language used in privacy policies 
difficult to understand, The interviewees that did read privacy policies indicated that 
they viewed the reading as part of a learning process that is indispensable to assuming 
responsibility for one‟s personal information and thus be able to take adequate 
protective measures. However, even those readers expressed difficulties in the 
learning process. 
The survey did not ask whether users considered the information provided reliable 
and accurate (C4.3). However, as indicated above, users want to know the reputation 
of data controllers in order to decide whether to trust them and, therefore, reliable and 
accurate information is important to them. Importantly, trust in online companies is 
limited.
25
 
With regard to accessibility of the information provided (C4.4), of the 26% of the 
respondents indicating that they never read the privacy statements, only 4% did not 
know where to find privacy policies on a website. Similar patterns can be observed 
with other information, such as changing privacy settings. Most respondents to 
indicated that they change privacy settings. Of the people who never changed their 
privacy settings (18% of the respondents), 10% indicated that they did not know that 
privacy settings existed whilst 11% indicated that they did not know they could 
change the privacy settings. Hence, most people know where to find this information. 
                                               
22 B Van den Berg and S Van der Hof, see note 19 above. 
23 B Custers et al, see note 2 above. 
24 Eurobarometer, see note 10 above, at 112.  
25
 Eurobarometer, see note 10 above, at 137. 
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4. Legal Provisions 
Our next step was to determine the existence of legal provisions for each of the 
consent criteria in Table 1, and depending on their existence, to qualify these legal 
provisions. This was done as to the existing and proposed legal framework of EU 
personal data protection. An overview of the results is presented in Table 2. The 
existing EU legal framework is constituted by the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC.
26
 For more background on the EU data protection directive, we refer to 
further literature.
27
 The proposed legal framework was published in January 2012 by 
the European Commission.
28
 For more background on the proposed EU data 
protection regulation, we refer to further literature.
29,30
 
 
4.1 Legal Provisions in the Existing EU Framework 
The criteria for consent that are incorporated in the current EU Data Protection 
Directive are discussed in Section 4.1.1. The criteria that are not incorporated are 
discussed in Section 4.1.2. Some of the criteria are not included in the Directive, but 
are incorporated in other legal sources, such as regulations, policies, civil codes or 
legal practices. Most important among these sources is the Article 29 Working Party 
(Hereinafter “WP29”). WP29 is an advisory body to the European Commission on 
data protection issues and consists of representatives from the data protection 
authorities of each EU Member State. Although technically not part of the EU legal 
framework for data protection, the WP29 “Opinion 15/2011 on the Definition of 
Consent” is particularly relevant as it has given substance to the explanation of the 
Data Protection Directive‟s provisions on consent.31 Several of the criteria for consent 
set out in Table 1 are addressed by the WP29‟s Opinion 15/2011.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
26 Directive 95/46/EG of the European Parliament and the Council of 24th October 1995, [1995] OJ 
L281/31. 
27 Z Fox, see note 11 above. 
28 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Regulation), Brussels, 25.1.2012 COM(2012) 11 final 2012/0011 (COD). 
Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0011:FIN:EN:PDF 
(accessed 12 Dec 13). 
29 C Kuner “The European Commission‟s Proposed Data Protection Regulation: A Copernican 
Revolution in European Data Protection Law” (2012) Privacy and Security Law Report. 
30 G Hornung “A General Data Protection Regulation for Europe? Light and Shade in the 
Commission‟s Draft of 25 January 2012” (2012) 9 SCRIPTed 64-81. 
31 Article 29 Working Party, “Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent” available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2011/wp187_en.pdf (accessed 13 Dec 13). 
(Hereinafter, „WP29‟) 
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4.1.1 Incorporated Criteria 
Informed consent must be reasonably strong (C2.3). This is described in Article 7 of 
the Directive, where unambiguous consent is mentioned as a general ground for 
lawfulness of processing someone‟s personal data. Article 8, considers the processing 
of special categories of (sensitive) data that would otherwise be prohibited, whereby 
explicit consent is included as one possible condition to lawfully process such data. 
Explicit consent means that the person who is giving the consent is aware of the 
issues are and what the consequences of his or her consent are. According to the 
WP29, unambiguous consent means that the procedure to seek and give consent must 
leave no doubt as to the data subject's intention to provide consent. For instance, 
consent based on disinterest (e.g. lack of complaint) is not considered unambiguous 
consent. The burden of proof for having obtained consent rests with the data 
controller. 
The consent must be an independent decision (C2.4). This means that the decision has 
to be independent of the controlling influences of others. This criterion can be found 
in Article 2(h) of the Data Protection Directive, which states that consent has to be 
freely given. According to the WP29, consent is only freely given when the data 
subject is able to exercise a real choice and there is no risk of deception, intimidation, 
coercion or significant negative consequences if he or she does not consent.
32
 
It must be clear which data are collected (C3.1). On social network sites, it may be 
obvious which data are collected from the data subject, but when data is collected 
indirectly, this may be less obvious. It is important that a data subject knows which 
data is collected, so he or she can decide: whether this information is sensitive, 
whether it is relevant to the purposes of the data controller, whether the information is 
correct and complete, etc . Article 10 of the Directive requires the data controller to 
provide the data subject with information, including information about the existence 
of the right of access and the right to rectify the data. This means that the data subject 
has access to the data collected about him. Where the data controller has not obtained 
the data from the data subject itself, Article 11(1)(c) obliges the data controller to 
provide the data subject with information about the categories of data concerned and 
also about the existence of the right of access and the right to rectify the data. 
In order to assess the consequences of providing consent, it should be clear for which 
purposes personal data are collected (C3.2). Article 6(1)(b) of the Directive requires 
that personal data only be processed if the purposes are specified, explicit and 
legitimate. Article 10(b) obliges the data controller to provide the data subject with 
the purposes of the processing for which the data is intended. Where the data has not 
been obtained from the data subject, Article 11(b) requires the controller to provide 
the purposes of the processing. 
Some individuals may want to know what security measures are taken to protect their 
personal data prior to giving consent (C3.3). Article 16 of the Directive states that, in 
principle, personal data may only be processed on instructions from the data 
controller. Article 17 compels Member States to provide that the controller 
implements appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect personal 
data. However, the Directive does not require that users are informed about any such 
security measures. 
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For the individual providing consent, it may be important to know the identity of 
whom is collecting and processing his or her personal data (C3.4). This can enable 
him or her to check the trustworthiness of the data controller. Some data controllers 
may have a good reputation, whereas others may be less reliable according to a data 
subject. It is also important to know who should be contacted in cases of incorrect or 
incomplete data. Articles 10(a) and 11(1)(b) of the Directive require the data 
controller to reveal its identity and the identity of its representatives, if any. 
It must be made clear for the data subject which rights can be exercised and how they 
can be exercised (C3.5). Article 12 of the Directive contains the right of access, while 
Article 14 provides for the data subject's right to object and Article 15 the right for 
every individual not to be subject to decisions which produce legal effects concerning 
or significantly affects him or her, and which is solely based on automated processing 
of data. Article 13 allows Member States to adopt legislative measures to restrict the 
scope of obligations and rights provided in the Directive to safeguard national or 
public security, defence, criminal investigation, important economic or financial 
interests of the Member State or the European Union, monitoring, inspection or 
regulatory functions or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
The information provided must be specific and sufficiently detailed (C4.1). This 
follows from Article 2(h), provides that consent is 'any freely given specific and 
informed indication of his wishes by which the data subject signifies his agreement to 
personal data relating to him being processed', whilst Article 6(1)(b) states that the 
purposes for processing data must be specified, explicit and legitimate. This also 
suggests that the data must be reliable and accurate (C4.3). The Directive does not 
require that the information provided be understandable or accessible, however the 
WP29 provides this as an extra requirement in their opinion on consent. Consent 
cannot be informed when the data subject does not understand the information 
provided. If the data subject has difficulties with accessing the information, this may 
inhibit the individual‟s ability to take note of and read the information.  
Furthermore, the information provided should be reliable and accurate (C4.3). Article 
6(1)(b) of the Directive states that personal data can only be collected for certain 
reasons. The data controller has to inform the data subject about what data he will 
process, for what reasons and for what time. In Article 10 and Article 11 of the 
Directive, it is specified what information the controller has to supply to the data 
subject in order to legitimately process that person‟s data. 
 
4.1.2 Non-Incorporated Criteria 
The Data Protection Directive gives no indication as to what age an individual has to 
reach in order to be able to give consent (C1.1). The requirements for legally valid 
consent by minors can be found in each Member State‟s national legislation; since 
this has not been harmonised, these requirements vary throughout Europe. In some 
Member States, for instance in the Netherlands, both the minor and his representative 
are required to give consent in order for it to be legally binding, unless the child is 
already deemed to be able to make an informed decision. However, the age at which a 
child is mature enough to make an informed decision, and the procedures to determine 
this, vary between the Member States. According to WP29, it is important to take the 
position of children into account when reviewing the Data Protection Directive; 
because of the lack of harmonisation on the general age of children to give legally 
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binding consent, there is no recognition for the need of special protection of children 
in specific circumstances. Additionally, the lack of a defined age for children to give 
consent causes legal uncertainty, particularly in the light of the international scope of 
most SNSs and UGCs.  
The Data Protection Directive contains no special provisions for consent concerning 
individuals who do not have full legal capacity (C1.2 and C1.3). Member States have 
national provisions for consent by legally incompetent persons, but WP29 finds that 
the Directive should have additional provisions concerning the protection of this 
vulnerable group. WP29 raises a number of issues, which should be considered when 
reviewing the Directive:
33
  
 Some of the provisions should include under which circumstances both the 
individual‟s consent and the consent of his representative are required;  
 A provision concerning under which circumstances consent can be given by 
just the caretaker, without the individual‟s consent;  
 Provisions clarifying in which cases consent is excluded from lawfulness; 
 Provisions introducing (mandatory) use of online age-verification. 
Written consent (C2.1) is not required by the Directive. Article 2(h) of the Directive 
describes „any indication of his wishes (…) signify‟ as a way of providing consent. 
„Any‟ indication of a wish is sufficient under the Directive. The Directive 
intentionally did not limit consent to „written consent‟ in order to create a wide scope. 
The term „indication‟ should be read in combination with the term „signify‟ in the 
provision; the indication should include a wish, by which the data subject signifies his 
agreement. This „signification‟ can include any form of behaviour by which consent 
can be reasonably concluded. However, passive behaviour seems to reach the lower 
limit of this provision; although the notion of „indication‟ is wide, it seems to imply 
some need for action and, therefore, explicitness. At this point, it is also relevant to 
point out the difference between the „regular consent‟ of Article 2(h) and the 
„unambiguous consent‟ of Article 7(a) as a legal basis for processing. The WP29 
states in its opinion on consent that:  
(…) unambiguous consent does not fit well with procedures to obtain consent 
based on inaction or silence from individuals: a party's silence or inaction has 
inherent ambiguity (the data subject might have meant to consent or might 
merely have meant not to perform the action).
34
 
If there is partial consent instead of full consent (C2.2), personal data can only be 
processed for the purpose that has been consented to. However, in practice, and 
particularly in the online context, full consent is asked and required: the only option is 
either to accept or reject the terms and conditions under which personal data will be 
processed. Note that there are no legal obligations to provide options for partial 
consent. 
The consent of the data subject must be up to date (C2.5), as it must match the actual 
data processing. However, data processing activities may change and expand over 
time. While there is no explicit requirement in the current Data Protection Directive 
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mandating that consent is „up to date‟, this requirement may be inferred from the 
principles of purpose specification and use limitation (i.e. the data collected may only 
be used for the purposes specified in advance) as set forth in Article 6(1)(b). If the 
data subject provides consent for a specific, well-defined purpose, any substantial 
deviation from this purpose will require a renewal or confirmation of the consent. 
Finally, the information provided has to be understandable and accessible (C4.2 and 
C4.4). Consent must be based on information provided beforehand. The provided 
information has to be sufficient to enable a person to make an informed decision 
about the processing of his personal data. According to WP29, two requirements 
derive from the fact that consent must be based on information. First, the information 
must be supplied in a language the data subject can understand, so the individual 
knows what is consented to. Information that is too technical or complicated, does not 
meet the legal requirements of Article 6. Second, the provided information must be 
clear and recognisable, so it will not be overlooked. It does not suffice to supply 
information somewhere random or hidden.  
 
4.2 Legal Provisions in the Proposed EU Framework 
The criteria for consent that are provided for in the current Data Protection Directive 
are similarly provided for in the proposed Data Protection Regulation. The relevant 
articles can be found in Table 2. However the proposed Regulation offers some 
additional criteria. These criteria (C1.1, C4.2 and C4.4) are discussed in this 
subsection. Our analysis of the proposed Regulation begins with the new definition of 
and conditions for consent. 
In the proposed Regulation, the use of consent for legitimising data processing would 
be significantly restricted. The definition of consent is tightened in Article 4(8), since 
it must always be explicit (i.e. opt-in). The Regulation removes the current distinction 
between „consent‟, „unambiguous consent‟ and „explicit consent‟, instead opting for a 
single definition of consent in Article 4(8): 
(…) the data subject's consent means any freely given specific, informed and 
explicit indication of his or her wishes by which the data subject, either by a 
statement or by a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to personal data 
relating to them being processed. 
The conditions for consent are further set out in Article 7: 
1. The controller shall bear the burden of proof for the data subject's consent to 
the processing of their personal data for specified purposes. 
2. If the data subject's consent is to be given in the context of a written declaration 
which also concerns another matter, the requirement to give consent must be 
presented distinguishable in its appearance from this other matter. 
3. The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. 
The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based 
on consent before its withdrawal. 
4. Consent shall not provide a legal basis for the processing, where there is a 
significant imbalance between the position of the data subject and the 
controller. 
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The single biggest change in this new constellation is that consent, by means of an 
indication of wishes, is no longer recognised as legitimate (versus Article 2(h) under 
the current Directive). This means that under the new Regulation it may be argued 
that consent will need to be reasonably strong by definition, as it requires a specific, 
informed and explicit indication of wishes. This may have considerable consequences 
for companies engaged in e-commerce and online activities, for instance, by requiring 
an increased use of pop-up boxes and other mechanisms on websites that indicate a 
user‟s consent. This may conflict with Recital 25, which provides that electronic 
consent should not be unnecessarily disruptive. 
Under the proposed Regulation there are now specific provisions for parental consent 
when children are below the age of 13 (C1.1). Article 8(1) provides:  
(…) in relation to the offering of information society services directly to a 
child, the processing of personal data of a child below the age of 13 years shall 
only be lawful if and to the extent that consent is given or authorized by the 
child's parent or custodian. The controller shall make reasonable efforts to 
obtain verifiable consent, taking into consideration available technology. 
The European Commission may further specify the way in which consent can be 
obtained through delegated acts (Article 8(3) and Recital 129). Furthermore, the 
conditions for obtaining consent set out in Article 8(1) may not affect the general 
contract law of Member States such as the rules on the validity, formation or effect of 
a contract in relation to a child. 
Another relevant change in the context of consent is the more explicit requirements 
for information to be given to the data subject (Article 11), especially that this 
information is both understandable and accessible. (C4.2 and C4.4). First of all, the 
data controller must have transparent and easily accessible policies with regard to the 
processing of personal data and for the exercise of data subjects' rights. Furthermore, 
the data controller shall provide any information and any communication relating to 
the processing of personal data to the data subject in an intelligible form, using clear 
and plain language, adapted to the data subject, in particular for any information 
addressed specifically to a child. 
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Table 2: Legal provisions for the criteria for consent 
 
 
Legal obligation in the existing 
Data Protection Directive? 
Legal obligation in the proposed 
Data Protection Regulation? 
C1.1 No, but obligation in most civil codes Yes (Article 8), to be further specified in 
delegated acts (recital 129). 
C1.2 No, but obligation in most civil codes Obligation in most civil codes 
C1.3 No, but obligation in most civil codes Obligation in most civil codes 
C2.1 No No 
C2.2 Yes, where required (Article 6(1)(b)) Yes (Articles 5(b )and 6(1)(a)) 
C2.3 Yes (Articles 7- 8) Yes (Article 4(8)) 
C2.4 Yes (Article (2)(h)) Yes (Article 4.(8)) 
C2.5 No No (but consent must match current practices) 
C3.1 Yes (Articles 10, 11 (1)(c)) Yes (Articles 5, 14) 
C3.2 Yes (Articles (6)(1)(b), 10(b), 11(1)(b)) Yes (Articles 5, 14) 
C3.3 Yes (Articles 16-17) Yes (Article 30) 
C3.4 Yes (Article 10(a), 11(1)(a)) Yes (Article 14) 
C3.5 Yes (Articles 12-15) Yes (Article 14) 
C4.1 Yes (Articles 2(h), 6(1)(b)) Yes (Article 14) 
C4.2 No, but WP29 opinion sets this requirement Yes (Article 14) 
C4.3 Yes (Article 6(1)(b)) Yes (Articles 5, 14) 
C4.4 No, but WP29 opinion sets this requirement Yes (Article 14) 
 
5. Gap Analysis and Solutions to Address Disconnections 
In this section, a gap analysis will be made between, on the one hand, the results of 
the previous section (which criteria are addressed in the current and in the proposed 
EU legal framework) and on the other hand, the user expectations regarding these 
criteria (see Section 3). This gap analysis will show which criteria are insufficiently 
addressed from a legal perspective. From this analysis, suggestions will be drawn for 
both practical changes and changes in the legal framework to address any disconnects 
resulting from the gap analysis. 
The proposed Regulation does contain specific provisions for parental consent (C1.1) 
and sets the age threshold at thirteen years old. Parental consent is only required for 
children until the age of thirteen under the proposed Regulation.
35
 It also states that 
the data controller should make reasonable efforts to obtain verifiable consent. 
Furthermore, the proposed Regulation emphasises the risk that children cannot fully 
comprehend the dangers related to data processing (Recital 53). As such, the proposed 
Regulation does harmonise the age for consent to some extent and recognises that 
minors between the ages of thirteen-eighteen years old are very active on social media 
and require special protection (recital 29 and 38). We agree with this point of view, 
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which was also considered important by users, but note that there are little or no 
provisions in the proposed Regulation to make this special protection more concrete. 
Apart from notes on parental consent in Article 8, the only provisions relating to this 
issue are Article 33 (providing special focus on personal data of children when 
performing data protection impact assessments), Article 38 (special focus on child 
protection when drafting codes of conduct) and Article 52 (special focus on children 
when supervisory authorities promote awareness). These provisions ask for special 
attention to be given to children, but none of them substantiates how this should be 
achieved.  
Another remark to be made concerns the enforcement of the provision in Article 8 
regarding consent of minors. Although it should be mentioned that the proposed 
Regulation creates the opportunity for the European Commission to adopt delegated 
acts and lay down further standards for obtaining verifiable consent (paragraph 3 and 
4 of Article 8), practical issues may arise. For instance, how can social media actually 
verify the age of their users? A simple click on a button stating “I am over eighteen” 
or “I am between the ages of thirteen and eighteen, but my parents consent to […]” 
may easily be abused, as minors may not tell their real age. According to a recent 
study, 44% of teens have lied about how old they are online to access sites with age 
restrictions.
36
  
From other contexts, the practice of showing identification cards such as passports 
verifies age for purchase of alcohol and tobacco; however such age restrictions are 
difficult to apply in online situations. An online version of this practice may require 
introduction of an online age certificate, but that would involve a considerable (and 
costly) architecture. Moreover, an age verification scheme may raise new privacy 
issues, as it may entail more processing and sharing of personal data. Furthermore, it 
may limit the possibilities for anonymous use of SNSs and UGCs, or the use of 
pseudonyms. The available procedures to establish the authenticity of the parental 
consent (e.g. sending an e-mail from a parents e-mail account provided at the time of 
signing in, the provision of the parents‟ credit card details, a written consent form 
from the parent, or a telephone call from the parent) have been criticised for being 
easy to circumvent and workable alternatives have not yet emerged.
37
  
Similarly, most UGCs and SNSs do not address the issue of whether a person is 
competent and authorised to use its services (C1.2 and C1.3). Some pose conditions, 
such as a minimum age threshold, whereas others, like Wikipedia, explicitly consider 
everyone competent. It may be suggested that people with limited capacities to 
navigate and use the Internet, for instance, due to psychological disorders or limited 
mental abilities, may deserve special protection – similar to those afforded to children. 
Neither the current Directive nor proposed Regulation offer such special protection. 
However, it should be noted that increased attention to different capacities and 
authorisation is not considered important by users. Furthermore, enforcement of 
requirements regarding competences and capabilities may be difficult, as UGCs and 
SNSs may include such requirements in their privacy statements but could experience 
difficulties in checking whether users actually meet these criteria. We recommend that 
the proposed Regulation is amended in such a way that this category of user is offered 
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similar protection to minors, although we immediately note that this may raise the 
same issues as with minors discussed above: the proposed Regulation is not clear 
about how special protection is to be provided or on how enforcement will take place. 
Written consent (C2.1) is not a legal requirement for consent, either in the current 
Data Protection Directive or the proposed Regulation. Although this is important to 
users, we think the main reason for not requiring written consent is because providing 
consent should be technology independent. With the rise of all kinds of multimedia 
applications, other forms of providing consent may become more common in the 
future. In such a situation, the requirement of written consent may turn out to be a 
hindrance. Nevertheless, written consent serves two main purposes: it removes the 
ambiguity from the consent, and it serves an evidentiary purpose. As such, in our 
view, written consent remains the preferred option. 
With regard to partial consent (C2.2), most UGCs and SNSs offer possibilities to 
tweak privacy settings. Facebook even patented a method for profiling privacy setting 
selections of its users.
38
 Users do appreciate and use such possibilities to personalise 
their privacy settings, including options for audience segregation. Hence, we 
recommend that such privacy settings offer more options and that they are brought to 
the attention of users more often. For instance, it may be suggested that privacy 
settings are part of the set-up or registration process. We also recommend more 
options for audience segregation, which is slightly different from the regular privacy 
settings. Most privacy settings are limited to setting the extent to which information is 
shared, whereas audience segregation involves showing different information from 
one particular profile to different groups. 
It may be questioned whether the consent users provide to SNSs or UGCs is strong 
consent (C2.3). As indicated above, the CONSENT survey results provide indications 
that many users do not read the privacy statements and terms and conditions. Since 
we assume that consent should always be informed consent, we think reading and 
understanding the information provided, such as the privacy statements along with 
terms and conditions is important for establishing informed consent. However, users 
do not seem to think this is important. When looking at the practical methods in which 
users provide consent, this is often by ticking a box which indicates they have read 
(and sometimes that they have understood) the terms and conditions (and sometimes 
also the privacy statement). Although we recommend the use of tick boxes for reasons 
of clarity, unambiguity and explicitness, we think the use of tick boxes can be 
improved by only using tick boxes in which the terms and conditions are actually 
shown, as additional clicks may discourage users from further reading. 
Whether consent is an independent decision (C2.4), is difficult to answer, since the 
qualitative interview results suggest that users have a rather ambivalent relationship to 
UGC websites. Many users appear to sign up for accounts due to certain forms of peer 
pressure, but after an initial phase become low-frequency users. Some people have 
worries regarding the monopoly of some sites, such as Facebook,
39
 whereas others 
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think this is not a real concern.
40
 Regular EU competition laws apply to these issues, 
but we will not discuss this in detail as we consider this beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
Although users indicated in the interviews that they considered it important to be 
frequently updated on policy changes (C2.5), during our analysis of privacy 
statements we were surprised how outdated many of the privacy statements were.
41
 
More importantly, is that (according to the terms and conditions of most UGCs and 
SNSs) users often do not have to be notified about changes in the privacy statement. 
Most data controllers simply state that users have to check the website for any 
changes in the privacy policy. This is something that users obviously do not do. 
Therefore, we think a more active notification on changes is preferable. Furthermore, 
nearly all changes in privacy statements come from data controllers. Data subjects 
have no influence on the privacy statements. Of the websites analysed, only Facebook 
offered its users to influence policy changes, although the conditions set forth may be 
hard to meet. Instead of the current unilateral changes in privacy statements, changes 
based on shared ideas/beliefs of users may be preferable. Finally, we think updates on 
consent can be strongly enhanced by including sunset provisions in the consent 
decision. This means that consent should legally expire when it is not updated after 
some time, say within two or three years. This may ensure a more active notification 
policy of data controllers and prevents outdated consent. 
Clarity regarding which data are collected, used and shared (C3.1) and for which 
purposes (C3.2) are important to users and sufficiently supported by the legal 
framework. We recommend more transparency regarding the data collected, used and 
shared, as most data are provided during the registration process and users may forget 
after some time which data they provided. Although we think that purpose 
specification is gradually losing meaning for several reasons,
42
 there is a strong focus 
on purpose specification in EU data protection legislation. 
Regarding concerns for security measures (C3.3), the survey results show that the 
portion of respondents applying various security measures is on average clearly above 
50% and in some countries up to 90%. At the same time, the survey results showed 
that most UGC/SNS users think it unlikely that by putting personal information on 
these websites their personal safety is put at risk, that they risk becoming a victim of 
fraud or discrimination, or that they would suffer reputational damage. The resulting 
figures allow for the conclusion that many individuals use their technical knowledge 
to specifically protect themselves against physical or material risks – and, thus, do not 
show too much concern in this respect. Users may, however, overestimate the quality 
of their security measures. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that users easily 
share lots of information (see C3.1 above).  
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In the current and proposed EU data protection legislation, security measures are an 
obligation of the data controller. We think this is a rather one-sided approach. When 
users are careless with their data and with security measures, data controllers can do 
little about this. We think that security is a joint responsibility of both users and data 
controllers. That does not mean that a user is always fully to blame for incidents when 
he of she has taken no security measures, but it does mean that users are to some 
extent responsible. We recommend that this joint responsibility is also expressed in 
the proposed legislation, for instance, by limiting the accountability of data controllers 
in cases of security breaches when users can be proven to have been very careless 
with their passwords, data or other security measures. 
The identity and accountability of the data controller should be clear according to 
both the current and the proposed EU data protection legislation (C3.4). Users think 
this is important. We did not see any examples in which there is no compliance with 
this requirement. Therefore, we have no recommendations regarding this criterion.  
Even though most privacy statements clearly indicate user rights (C3.5), 72% of the 
respondents never, rarely or sometimes read the terms and conditions before accepting 
them, indicating that users may not be well informed about their rights. Although 
users may also have access to other sources (such as consumer protection websites) to 
inform themselves about their rights, it can be questioned whether such (more 
general) sources could fully substitute the (more specific) user rights in privacy 
statements. Note that not reading privacy statements does not necessarily indicate 
disinterest. Only 7.4% of the respondents not reading privacy statements indicated 
disinterest as the main reason for non-reading. Other reasons were perceived 
helplessness, a more general belief in law and order or the perception that privacy 
statements served the protection of website owners rather than its users. These 
findings are confirmed by other research, showing that users are not always aware 
(enough) of their rights and obligations with respect to sharing personal data.
43
 User 
expectations remain at a much more general and much less legally detailed level.  
However, we expect that users are interested in their rights when something has gone 
wrong. As such, we recommend that user rights are also presented at the complaints 
site of a SNS or UGC. In most EU member states, users must go to court to enforce 
their user rights. It may be argued that for issues arising out of use of SNSs and 
UGCs, that this is a very high threshold; for instance, because of the costs involved. 
Other options may be less prohibitive. For instance, an option may be that complaints 
can be made to a national Data Protection Authority, who can then investigate the 
complaint, mediate or provide a decision or ruling. However, neither the current nor 
the proposed EU data protection legislation provides individual users with a right to 
make complaints at their national Data Protection Authority. We do not recommend 
this as the best option, but we do recommend consideration of other ways to address 
data controllers that are not compliant with data protection legislation. Having said 
that, we are convinced that the proposed EU data protection legislation does provide 
stronger measures for enforcement than the current legal framework. 
The proposed EU data protection legislation also mentions a new user right: the right 
to be forgotten. It is questionable whether this right would mean any additional 
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protection vis-à-vis the already existing right to erasure under the current EU Data 
Protection Directive. 
Regarding specific and sufficiently detailed information (C4.1), users explicitly 
indicate that they do not want to spend much time on reading privacy statements. 
However, at the same time, they want to be informed properly. As straightforward 
solutions to this problem we suggest that information is offered in several layers, that 
summaries are offered and other tools are used to support the decision-making process 
of the consumer (such as machine readable privacy policies and visualisation tools, 
other than labels or icons). 
Regarding understandable information (C4.2), users indicate that they do understand 
the information provided in privacy statements: 63.6% of the respondents of the 
survey indicated that they understand the privacy statements completely or at least 
most part of them. However, for those users that do not completely understand the 
information provided or for those users who overestimate themselves in this respect, 
we think there is room for improvement regarding the understandability of the 
information. We think legal jargon should be avoided and that the text should not be 
too long. Users do not have much interest in visualisations, such as icons or 
labeling.
44
 The proposed Regulation mandates data controllers to have transparent and 
easily accessible policies (Article 11), but we think this is difficult to enforce, as it is 
difficult to determine whether policies are transparent and easily accessible. 
We do think, however, that the understandability of privacy statements can be 
improved by having them read by representative groups of users. We do not know 
which SNSs and UGCs use this approach, but considering the fact that most changes 
in privacy statements are unilateral decisions of data controllers, we expect this is not 
a common practice. Rather, we think that most privacy statements (and terms and 
conditions) are drafted by legal experts in legal departments of data controllers, 
without prior review by individual users. 
Although we have not seen any examples of information that is unreliable or 
inaccurate (C4.3), and although we do not doubt that most companies (particularly 
online companies) will take good care to protect their reputation by providing reliable 
and accurate information, it may be good to check the information provided for 
accuracy and reliability. However, this may be difficult to do for individual users, as 
they may not have insight into the data processing and other operations of SNSs and 
UGCs. Therefore, we think this is a task for national Data Protection Authorities. 
They could investigate whether the information provided does in fact reflect the 
practices (particularly data processing practices) within a SNS or UGC. The 
competences for such investigations are present in both the current Directive and the 
proposed Regulation. 
Regarding the accessibility of information (C4.4), we have not seen any examples of: 
privacy statements that had to be paid for; that were in languages other than those of 
the targeted user groups; or that were behind a non-functioning link. The privacy 
statements we investigated were in fact easy to find. In most cases, there was a link to 
the privacy statement on every website of the SNS or UGC. Therefore, we do not 
think accessibility of the information is a major issue. SNSs and UGCs know they 
have to provide information and there do not seem to be any intentions to hide such 
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information. The proposed legislation makes this even more explicit (Article 14). 
Therefore, we have no recommendations regarding this criterion. 
 
6. The Limits of Consent 
Before offering the conclusions of this paper, we would like to make a critical note. 
All recommendations made in the previous section are aimed at improving the current 
models for personal data protection and procedures for consent. However, in addition 
to improving the current models, we think it is also important to discuss the model 
itself. 
The current models for personal data protection use the concept of informational self-
determination as a basis. This concept can be traced to the work of Alan Westin,
45
 
who referred to privacy in terms of control over information, describing it as a 
person‟s right to determine for himself when, how, and to what extent information 
about him is communicated to others.
46
 This indicates how, with the rise of 
information and communication technologies, the focus of privacy legislation has 
shifted from the protection of such things as family, home, and reputation towards the 
protection of personal information and informational self-determination.  
Personal data protection was shaped in the 1970s and the 1980s as a set of principles 
on how personal data can be collected and processed in fair ways. In the US, this was 
done in the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs)
47
 and in Europe, this was 
done in the principles for fair information processing developed by the OECD.
48
 The 
latter were later incorporated in the Treaty of Strasbourg
49
 of the Council of Europe 
and in the current EU Data Protection Directive. All these principles boil down to a 
set of conditions under which personal data can be collected and processed (limited 
collection, data quality, specified purposes and limited use) and duties of data 
controllers (security safeguards, transparency, user rights and accountability). 
When privacy is narrowed down to a set of principles for personal data protection, 
this has serious consequences for consent. In short, under the current Directive, 
consent legitimises nearly any form of collecting and processing personal data. At the 
same time, the current tools for informational self-determination do not provide data 
subjects significant ways to control the use of their personal data. For instance, in 
many situations, a user does not have any rights to have data deleted.
50
 Furthermore, 
consent is often a take-it-or-leave-it situation: when a user does not consent to all 
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terms and conditions of an SNS or UGC, in many cases he or she is plainly denied 
access. 
Solove argues that the current models based on informational self-determination fail 
to offer adequate privacy protection.
51
 He mentions several cognitive problems (on 
how people make decisions) and several structural problems (on how privacy 
decisions are architected), and why people are not even close to the model of 
informational self-determination. Basically, he argues, the model has too many 
hurdles: (1) people do not read privacy policies; (2) if they do read them, they do not 
understand them; (3) if people read and understand them, they often lack enough 
background knowledge to make an informed decision; (4) if people read them, 
understand them and can make an informed decision, they are not always offered the 
choice that reflects their preferences.  
We think, together with Solove, that the current and proposed legislation, based on the 
model of informational self-determination, has many virtues and should not be 
abandoned. That is why, in this research, we tried to further improve the current 
models. But at the same time we notice that current models do not always reflect how 
people use SNSs and UGCs in practice. For instance, if a website has taken all 
privacy principles into account (which is normally the case), it means they have a 
sound and complete privacy policy (from a legal perspective), but this does not imply 
that the privacy policy is also fair (from an ethical perspective). Users may disagree 
with some of the terms and conditions. The survey results show that many people are 
unhappy with how their personal data is collected and processed, the choices they are 
offered and how their privacy is taken care of.
52
 Hence, apart from optimising the 
current models, we think a further discussion on other, additional models is useful. 
Therefore, we strongly recommend further research in this area. 
7. Conclusions 
Based on our analysis, we conclude that both the current and the proposed legal 
framework address many, but certainly not all the aspects of consent that we 
investigated. The current Directive and proposed Regulation only provide a very 
general scope regarding consent and do not contain many details on how adequate 
consent procedures should look like. From our gap analysis it follows that there is, at 
some points, a disconnect between the abstract legal provisions and the concrete 
practical implementations in the architecture and privacy statements of SNSs and 
UGCs. These disconnects can be solved either by including more concrete provisions 
regarding the consent procedures in the legal framework or by changes at the practical 
level, such as architectural changes or changes in privacy statements. 
Finally, we note that improving the current models for personal data protection, based 
on informational self-determination, and the procedures for consent derived from 
these models may not be sufficient to protect the privacy of social media users and 
meet their expectations regarding privacy and consent. Although optimising the 
current models in the proposed EU legislation has many virtues and the concept of 
informational self-determination should not be abandoned, further research is needed 
on additional models better reflecting how people use social media in practice. 
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